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General Problems of Setting Up Guerrilla

Units

The Theory and Practice of Guerrilla War-  
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## THEORY AND PRACTICE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

### CHAPTER IV.

#### General Problems of Setting Up Guerilla Units

A. Enlargement of Guerilla forces involves not only that of the central unit, but also the organization of numerous satellite units, as follows:

1. Captured arms should not be used exclusively by the central unit, but should also be distributed among the people to enable them to organize more guerilla units, as a physiological body does not grow by the expansion of a single cell, but by the multiplication of cells by segmentation in geometric ratio, to an infinite number.

Each cell is able to exist independently and to multiply itself. Likewise, guerilla units do not enlarge themselves, but beget brother guerilla units and friendly guerilla units not dependent upon them, that will not be inclined to combine into a single unit of regular troops, even though few in number. Regular troops should not absorb guerilla units, but should organize new guerilla forces. In the initial stages, the way to enlarge a guerilla force rapidly is to distribute arms to the people to enable them to organize more units.

It is best that arms be dealt out parsimoniously since a group with few arms will not depend entirely on what it has, but will expand by the use of old style weapons, furthermore, where weapons and ammunitions are scarce they will be treasured and not allowed to fall easily into the hands of the enemy. In many guerilla units short of weapons when the man with the gun is killed another picks up his weapon and carries on. Peasant guerilla units that are without knowledge of military government should be loaned a couple of cadres to drill them in actual war games, as apprentices are trained in handicrafts.

Another method is to send a cadre with military training out among the people to carry on political work and take advantage of the arms that the people have to organize guerilla units. Frequently an enterprising cadre will be able to organize a sizeable guerilla unit in a month or two. A man with leadership ability will be able to gather about him defeated soldiers, militia men, and people's troops, and whip them into an effective unit. There are many opportunities for the able and experienced cadre to organize guerilla units in the territory occupied by the Japanese.

## 2. Expansion of Individual Guerilla Units.

Guerilla units tend to expand into regular troop units, and it is important that such units do become well organized. Guerilla units should not employ the draft to secure recruits, but should mobilize positivists from among the people and organize a portion of them into regular troops to be supported by guerillas as reserves.

## B. The Problem of Guerilla Cadres.

### 1. The Actual Selection of Working Cadres and Assignment of Work.

- a. The basic requirement is reliability in the cause of national liberation.
- b. In considering political attitudes, background of struggle, and economic background as criteria of selection, undue weight should not be given to daily experience alone to the disregard of political aspects.
- c. On the other hand <sup>we</sup>undue weight should not be given to political attitudes to the neglect of actual activity and experience.
- d. Cadres should be attracted from the local area, and developed ~~new cadres~~ out of struggle, rather than on the basis of personal family or neighbor relationships.

## 2. Leadership and Training of Cadres.

a. A leader must avoid pride and self esteem and especially bureaucratic and formalistic attitudes. A cadre may be known by his reports and recommendations and selected and controlled thereby.

b. The guidance of cadres is not only a matter of principle, it should also be based on reports of work, and the results of investigation of their work, conclusions drawn from discussion, and consideration of the requirements and possibilities of circumstances [environment]. Practical guidance can be based on these factors.

c. In order to encourage a cadreman's special abilities and correct his errors, and especially to elevate his positivism in his activities it is not necessary to use carping criticism.

d. Fulsome meaningless praise or harsh criticism should both be avoided.

e. Simple dependent<sup>ce</sup> upon a leader's experience is insufficient for proper guidance. It is necessary to supplement this with study of the experience of the masses and the cadres themselves.

## 3. Inspection of Cadre Activities.

a. Inspect according to the reported results of cadre activities.

b. Inspect according to the actual results of the cadre's administration.

c. Collate the reports of superiors and inferiors.

## 4. Rectification of Cadre Errors.

a. Point out all the implications of the error, its real importance, and its basis.

b. Demand his personal open recognition of his error in order that he may fully realize it and reform.

c. Point out the way of reform. This is most important. Avoid undue severity and do not lightly dismiss a cadre.

C. Special Features of Guerilla Organization (Mass characteristics, liveliness, organization).

1. Organization of guerilla units must be based on consideration of the requirements of topography, conditions of the people, situation of the enemy, and background of expansion. In accordance with the requirements of all the above conditions, guerilla units, basic cadre guerilla units, or guerilla cells may be organized.

2. Basic cadre guerilla units are those that are already on the way to becoming regular troops; guerilla units are small scattered troop units with a number of basic cadres as a core. <sup>Basic cadre unit</sup> ~~These units~~ may range from 100 to 500 rifles, their political activity and fighting ability is relatively great. They can be exemplars and leaders for other smaller units. They select cadres from the various units and assign them to positions of leadership in organizational activities.

3. Guerilla cells or groups made up of from five to ten positivists in each group who do not leave production activities. They are not necessarily armed. They move independently, according to conditions, in sudden strikes at the enemy with a view to disruption and destruction. At times they may join guerilla units or regular troops in battle.

4. Small guerilla units of 30 to 50 rifles are formed by uniting guerilla cells or by sending a group of cadres of this number from a basic cadre guerilla unit to arouse and organize the masses.

5. Guerilla forces, in order to make lightning strikes and forced marches, must be limited in numbers, but political, sanitary, and administrative organization is indispensable. Each medical worker, political advisor, party worker, and administrator must bear arms and engage in combat, and every combatant is at the same time a political propagandist.

6. All guerilla units, large or small, must have a party organization. Those units which have been without this should absorb leaders of the masses from guerilla units into the party to act as guerilla unit cores.

#### D. The Problem of Guerilla Force Education and Training.

1. Cadres as educational core guerilla forces should provide local areas with military government cadres to educate the masses out of their own actual experience and at the same time advance their own education.

2. Establish the Conference System. In the conference system they discuss, plan, and investigate the work. There should be collective discussion. The political activity involved in each military operation, whether a success or a failure, should be brought up for discussion, and definite conclusions reached. Every new turn of events, especially those problems affecting the political course, the fluctuations of political struggle and strategy, the fluctuations of military struggle and strategy should be discussed from every angle in order to reach stable conclusions.

3. Large basic cadre guerilla units should make up companies or platoons from positivist cadres and small basic cadre guerilla units should likewise organize the same type of platoons or squads to carry out systematic military and political education. Military education should consist of combat firing, bayonet practice, mountain climbing, sudden attack, attack from ambush, night movement, bivouac, and alarm. Political education

subjects are the basic responsibility of guerillas, the program of resistance and national reconstruction, and the political activities of military units.

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